A few days ago, the General Accounting Office released a new study
entitled, “Early Experiences of Two States That Offer Full
Public Funding for Political Candidates.” The report, which
was called for by a provision of the 2002 McCain-Feingold law,
documents a number of changes that have taken place since the
inception of Clean Elections systems in Maine and Arizona: more
candidates running, more contested races, more races decided by
competitive margins, and a modest increase in citizen confidence
in government. But it takes a cautious approach in drawing conclusions
from those and related findings, telling readers that it is “too
early to draw causal linkages to changes, if any, that resulted
from the public financing programs.”

That caution is a proper one. With only two elections from which
to study Clean Elections’ impact on legislative races (the
first of which having been clouded by legal challenges to the
implementation of the new system that artificially reduced candidate
participation) and only one cycle to examine its impact on statewide
races, it is far too soon to draw firm conclusions.

But a close reading of the GAO report suggests that its authors
have been perhaps too cautious in their analysis.

The GAO identified five measures for evaluating the public funding
programs in Maine and Arizona:

• did they increase voter choice by encouraging more candidates
  to run?
• did they increase electoral competition?
• did they reduce the influence of special interests and enhance
  citizen confidence in government?
• did they curb increases in the cost of campaigns?
• did they increase voter participation?

On each of these measures, there are encouraging signs in the
GAO’s own research. This is especially the case when one
looks at variations between the off-year elections of 1998 and
2002. Significantly more candidates participated in the public
funding system in 2002 than in 2000, in both states. The 2000
maiden run was affected by legal and technical uncertainties that
deterred many potential participants from using the system. Thus
it may be wisest to focus on comparisons between 1998 and 2002
(with some supplemental data not tapped by the GAO) to begin to
judge the full effects of the new system.

That comparison shows:

• significant increases in the average number of candidates
  per legislative race between 1998 and 2002, almost across the
  board
• greater diversity of candidates running in 2002, a factor
  not explored by the GAO
• a substantial increase in contested primaries in Arizona and
  a modest increase in Maine
• a decrease in incumbent re-election rates in both states’
  lower legislative chamber
• an increase in the number of races won by a competitive margin
  of 15% or less
• a net improvement of citizen confidence in government in both
  states (9% in Maine and 6% in Arizona)
• drops in average spending on legislative races in both states’
  lower chambers, and
• a drop in average spending on contested statewide races in
  Arizona (with the
• exception of the gubernatorial race, which was highly contested
  in 2002)
• improvements in voter turnout of 10% in Arizona and 5% in
  Maine

This is hardly the whole story, or the final chapter. With more
than half of Maine’s legislature and a third of Arizona’s
held by representatives who ran “clean,” the 2003-04
legislative session will be our first chance to see what kind
of changes take place in lawmaking when a sizable number of elected
officials aren’t worrying about where their next campaign
check is going to come from. In the meantime, the GAO’s
report shows lots of positive signs. To read a longer memo by
Public Campaign analyzing the report, click
here.